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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper is structured in two parts. In the first part we undertake a brief discussion 
on the concept of power and we explore the way this concept has been regarded in several 
strands  of  literature  on  management  accounting  –  the  conventional,  the  contingency,  the 
pluralist, the interpretive, the critical and the post-structuralist. Some of these strands – for 
instance,  the  pluralist,  the  critical  and  the  post-structuralist  –  explicitly  recognise  the 
importance of (some conception of) power in their approach to management accounting in 
society  and organisations.  Other  approaches  are  less  explicit  in that recognition  or  simply 
overlook/reject it.  
The  second  part  of  the  paper  takes  sides,  departing  from  the  idea  that  there  is  a 
relationship  between  management  accounting  and  power  and  proposes  a  framework  for 
conceptualising  that  relationship.  This  framework  attempts  to  bring  together  different 
dimensions/conceptions of power, and is proposed as a way to study management accounting 
and its change within organisations. 
 
JEL classification: M41 





















This paper is structured in two parts. In the first part we undertake a brief discussion 
on the concept of power and we explore the way this concept has been regarded in several 
strands  of  literature  on  management  accounting  –  the  conventional,  the  contingency,  the 
pluralist, the interpretive, the critical and the post-structuralist. Some of these strands – for 
instance,  the  pluralist,  the  critical  and  the  post-structuralist  –  explicitly  recognise  the 
importance of (some conception of) power in their approach to management accounting in 
society and organisations. Other approaches, however, are less explicit in that recognition or 
simply overlook/reject it.  
 
The  second  part  of  the  paper  takes  sides,  departing  from  the  idea  that  there  is  a 
relationship  between  management  accounting  and  power  and  proposes  a  framework  for 
conceptualising  that  relationship.  This  framework  attempts  to  bring  together  different 
dimensions/conceptions of power, and is proposed as a way to study management accounting 
and its change in organisations. 
 
 
2. Power and management accounting: a brief digression through the literature 
 
2.1. Conventional, contingency and pluralist approaches 
The  tone  of  conventional approaches  to management  accounting  is  normative:  the 
scope  of  management accounting  is often  limited to  decision-making  situations with well-
defined variables, assumptions, constraints and objectives. Neo-classical views of the firm and 
of human behaviour are more or less explicitly adopted (Scapens and Arnold, 1986; Scapens, 
1991; Ryan et al., 2002). No consideration is given to the organisational context in which 
management accounting operates. Well-defined and consensual organisational and sectional 
objectives, as well as the rational behaviour of organisations and organisational agents, are 
assumed. The possibility of conflict or clashes of interests is not considered. Also overlooked 
is the possibility that organisational objectives and behaviour are subsumed by asymmetrical 
power distributions. To a great extent, this view of management accounting is based on the 
mechanicist metaphor of organisations (Morgan, 1986). 
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The emergence, in the 1960’s and 1970’s, of behavioural aspects and the open social 
systems  approach  –  the  latter  culminating  in  contingency  theory  –  introduced  a  less 
mechanicist  and  a  more  organicist  perspective of  organisations (see  Chenhall, 2003, for a 
review  of  contingency  approaches).  The  key  insight  is  that  different  organisational 
configurations and processes are appropriate in different contexts. Organisations are systems 
with parts that must be coordinated in order to attain systemic goals. Such systems are subject 
to  pressures  from  human,  structural  and  environmental  variables.  Different  organisational 
forms and mechanisms of coordination, including management accounting systems, may be 
appropriate in different conditions. 
  
The  possibility  of  conflicting  interests  is,  at  least  implicitly,  accepted,  and  control 
issues are emphasised, in contrast to conventional research which focused more on issues of 
decision-making (Scapens, 1991; Ryan et al., 2002). This insight of contingency theory, that 
management accounting may be a mechanism of control over potential intra-organisational 
conflicts, is useful. However, contingency theory is functionalist in its essence. Organisations 
are seen as entities that respond to environmental pressures or other variables in a predictable 
fashion, given their search for efficiency and/or survival. Somehow, ‘triggers’ are pulled to 
counter or reconcile sectional interests, given the natural character of the objectives that the 
system seeks. Structural arrangements emerge in a relatively automatic manner given those 
objectives and in response to movements in the relevant independent variables. Management 
accounting systems may be one of the control mechanisms at stake here.  
 
Hence,  contingency  theory  neglects  situations  in  which  conflict  emerges,  and  the 
processes  and/or  manner  through  which  management  accounting  may  resolve  potential 
conflicts of interests in specific decision-making situations. This issue has been addressed by 
pluralist studies, which emerged as a result of the evidence that struggles and negotiations 
around organisational objectives and procedures are common in organisational life. Contrary 
to  the  previous  systemic  framework,  in  which  possible  sectional  interests  are  seen  as 
superseded because of wider pressures, pluralist studies focused on the processes of bargaining 
and negotiation through which those interests are reconciled and courses of action defined 
(Hopper  and  Powell,  1985).  Hence,  pluralists  avoid  the  assumption  that  consensus  will 
somehow  emerge  in  conformity  to  wider  systemic  pressures.  Space  is  allowed  for  the 
possibility that the decisions taken and then implemented, and the objectives sought, can come 
to deviate from the supposed ‘optimal’ ones. 
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Pluralist  studies  brought  attention  to  issues  of  power  and  politics  in  which  overt 
conflict of interests arises. Management accounting  systems  and techniques are devised as 
tools or resources deployed in situations of a clash of interests. However, the emphasis is on 
visible  episodes  of  decision-making.  Power  is  equated  with  those  who  are  capable  of 
advancing their own interests in those episodes. No consideration is given in pluralist studies 
to the less visible dimensions of power: for instance, how the rules underlying interactions and 
the material conditions of the social setting are decisive in shaping powers at an episodic level. 
A  consequence  is  that  pluralist  studies  implicitly  assume  that  power  may  be  absent  from 
organisational life. In Humean fashion, power is regarded by pluralists as absent if it is not 
exercised in visible episodes in which different interests are manifested and decisions emerge
9. 
In modern political science, such a perspective is present in work of behaviouralists such as 
Dahl (1957; 1961).  
 
At this point, a common trait of the approaches outlined in this section comes to the 
fore.  That  is  the  suggestion  that  power  is  absent  outside  episodes  in  which  interests  are 
observably confronted. This common assumption then frames specific conclusions about the 
relationship of management accounting with the phenomenon of power. This relationship is 
absent from conventional perspectives, since conflict is not considered under a framework of 
neoclassical  economic  assumptions.  For  contingency  theory,  management  accounting  is 
envisaged as a counter-force to potential (illegitimate) situations of conflict and power; but 
management accounting is not equated with power since the objectives of, and forces faced by, 
the system-organisation are seen as functional ones (and not in themselves manifestations of 
power). Pluralist perspectives, in turn, recognise that management accounting may be involved 
in conflicts, as a tool or resource deployed by parties to such conflicts, but its relationship with 
power ceases when conflicts are no longer observed.   
 
However, it may be argued that even in situations of apparent consensus, power is 
present. Indeed, such situations can be seen as an important manifestation of the phenomenon 
of power. This is related to an insight that has long been pointed out in the sociology of power 
(see, for instance, Barnes, 1988): to have power is not only to recurrently ‘win’ in situations of 
confrontation of interests, but also to take advantage of others’ acceptance of one’s authority 
and the legitimacy of one’s interests. By studying situations in which effects of power are 
produced, one is – in Barnes’ (1988) argument – escaping the key question of what constitutes 
                                                            
9  (…)  the  distinction,  which  we  often  make  betwixt  power  and  the  exercise  of  it,  is  (…)  without 
foundation (Hume, 1969: 222). 6 
power. That is, what constructs a powerful actor, capable of recurrently producing (whatever 
kind of) effects?  
 
  At stake here is a movement towards a more dispositional view of power, as a capacity 
or  disposition  to produce  effects  that exists even  if  not exercised.  Hence, to  draw  upon a 
classical example, the power of a policeman to direct the traffic is possessed by him even when 
he  is  not  doing  so.  Behaviouralists  like  Dahl  (1957;  1961)  would  be  content  with  the 
conclusion that the policeman has power because he can command drivers. But what fixes the 
policeman’s power? Is this power something intrinsic to him? 
 
The  acceptance  of  a  dispositional  conception  of  power  marks  a  twist  in  emphasis 
towards how powers are structured or fixed in a specific social system; i.e., what constitutes 
actors as capable of achieving outcomes in social relations. Ball (1976: 206-207) suggests that 
the lineage of research on power derived from metaphors of causality focuses on the search for 
law-like explanations of power. For instance, in Dahl’s (1957; 1961) account, the policeman’s 
recurrent success in producing effects – that is, to direct the traffic at crossroads – is seen in 
event causation terms. The signals he communicates are followed by responses by drivers, and 
hence the policeman is the source of power. However, as Ball (1976: 207) puts it: 
 
(…) what sort of laws are available as warranting generalizations for power 
explanations?  (…)  there  is  an  observable  regularity  or  constancy  of 
conjunction  between  police-signalling  behaviours  and  motorist-responding 
behaviours. But the regularity is not statable in Humean terms. For what we 
observe  in  the  signalling-obeying  relationship  is  not  the  instantiation  of  a 
universal law of human behaviour, but evidence that a rule is being applied 
and widely obeyed (emphasis in original).  
 
This statement raises two issues. Firstly, in Humean empiricist terms, the emphasis is 
on  observable  regularities  or  patterns  of  correlation  between  causes  and  effects.  Hence,  a 
policeman may be  said to  have  power  inasmuch as he  is capable of producing  effects on 
drivers.  The  concern  is  with  surface  correlations  rather  than  with  what  underlies  these. 
Therefore, in Humean terms, a law would state that an acid has the power to dissolve an object 
because observations lead to that conclusion. The identification of such a capacity is derived 
from recurrent observation of an effect.  
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However, the power of the acid to do so may be explained by its (and the object’s) 
intrinsic  chemical  constitution.  Here,  the  explanation  will  be  couched  less  on  surface 
observations, and more on the intrinsic natures that explain the causal powers of the acid to 
dissolve the object (or of the car engine to move the car, to come back to a previous example). 
At stake here is a realist conception in the natural sciences (Harré  and Madden, 1975) as 
opposed  to  an  empiricist  positivistic  one.  Entities  have  powers  that  will  eventuate  under 
specific standing conditions.  
 
A second issue raised by the above statement is the difference between the natural 
world and the social world. Realism has been applied to the social sciences (e.g. Bhaskar, 
1975), and specifically to the study of power (Ball, 1976; Benton, 1981). The key contention 
here is that human beings (like policemen) have intrinsic powers to produce specific effects in 
specific conditions, in a manner similar to an acid or an engine. However, there are obvious 
and crucial differences. These powers are not covered by laws, but rather are fixed in and 
through rules that are enacted by individuals who participate in social relations.  
 
Individuals in a social system possess knowledge of rules that are commonly accepted 
in that social system and enact them possibly in recurrent fashion. Hence, the power of a 
policeman in an intersection lies on the position of the policeman in a society in which there is 
widespread  knowledge  of  what  the  policeman  is,  of  what  his  signals  mean,  and  of  what 
constitutes an appropriate behaviour at an intersection. These are rules of meaning. They allow 
drivers  to  make  sense  of  situations  to  which  they  are  confronted,  and  to  respond  in 
knowledgeable fashion. In a sense, rules are linked to the concept of role (as suggested by 
symbolic interactionists, e.g. Turner, 1962). Drivers also interpret the role of the policeman in 
societies as that of orienting the traffic.  
 
2.2. Interpretive approaches: power in rules and institutions  
The  thrust  of  interpretive  studies  is  to  understand  the  meanings  and/or  rules  that 
individuals engaged in social interaction use to make sense of the situations they confront and 
to  construct  the  world  around  them.  Reality  under  interpretive  principles  is  socially 
constructed (Berger and Luckman, 1966). That is, reality is a human construction created in 
social  interaction.  What  appears  to  individuals  as  an  ‘objective’  world  results  from  the 
emergence of widely shared understandings that may in some situations acquire the status of 
facts. Interpretive principles have permeated the field of management accounting (classical 8 
references include Burchell et al., 1980; Boland and Pondy, 1983; Tomkins and Groves, 1983; 
Preston, 1986; see also Chua, 1988, for a critical review). 
 
Recently a group of authors, inspired by so-called ‘Old Institutional Economics’ (OIE) 
insights, have  adopted interpretive assumptions while explicitly considering the concept of 
power  (e.g.  Burns  and  Scapens,  2000;  Burns,  2000).  These  researchers  suggest  that 
institutionalised rules constitute an important dimension of the phenomenon of power. This 
implies the recognition that the power of actors is constrained or enhanced by prevailing rules 
framing social relations. This is so since these rules are fundamental in shaping motivations 
and behaviours of actors in a social system. The power of an actor to achieve desired outcomes 
across time and space will thus accrue from the ‘appropriateness’ of institutionalised rules in 
allowing for those outcomes.  
 
The issue in OIE writings is what fixes situations of recurrent following of rules. In 
OIE writings in management accounting, situations of social stability are created because some 
rules  are  taken-for-granted  and  routinely  enacted  (see  Ribeiro  and  Scapens,  2005).  One 
important issue is introduced here: will all the members of a social system be knowledgeable, 
in all times and spaces, of the rules that they should apply in all situations? One problem is that 
rules are not totally fixed and free from ambiguity. Individuals, members of a social system, 
are  constantly  engaged  in  attempts  to  give  meaning  to  situations  and  others  –  as 
ethnomethodologists such as Garfinkel (1967) have noted. Problems of interpretation and of 
indexicality of meaning are always inherent in such processes.  
 
Also, it may be hypothesised that – in a more extreme situation – an individual may 
simply not know the rules. A foreign driver may have difficulties in understanding the role and 
rules signalled by a policeman. Probably, this driver will orient himself towards others, by 
attempting  to  interpret  which  rules  are  followed  by  other  drivers  at  that  intersection.  The 
foreign  driver  will  be  conducting  membership  work  (Munro,  1999).  But  in  many  social 
situations (for instance, in organisational life), clear-cut ‘rules of meaning and membership’ 
may be unavailable and hence full conformity is never guaranteed. 
 
What leads drivers to follow rules possibly by orienting themselves to others, and to 
accept that the role of the policeman confers certain powers to him? As Barnes (see above) 
puts it, what leads drivers to ‘cease to exercise discretion over many of the actions of their own 
bodies’,  and  to  comply  with  a  situation  in  which  ‘a  few  [individuals]  acquire  effective 9 
discretion over those actions’? Parsons’ (1937; 1967) answer to this is a famous but widely 
criticised one: norms are internalised in socialised individuals. This counters tendencies to 
egoism  and  non-social  behaviour.  In  other  words,  Parsons  assumes  a  contrast  between 
calculative action by naturally self-interested and divisive individuals and the social norms 
that,  being  internalised  in  individual  minds,  lead  to  social  order;  i.e.,  a  normative  order. 
Calculative order is seen as an impossibility. Barnes (1988: 33) colourfully describes Parsons’ 
view: 
 
Enter baby; and the rush is on to get him socialized before he is big enough 
and strong enough to embark upon a career of pillage, rapine and murder. 
Unfortunate egoistic tendencies have to be subordinated to social rules and 
standards. 
 
The  view  of  OIE  writers  is  not  too  far  from  this  ‘internalisation’  view.  Routines 
become institutionalised as ‘the way things are done’ in people’s minds. Such strong rules 
become associated with everyday actions in relatively automatic fashion. 
 
But  social  stabilities  may  also  be  seen  as  resulting  from  calculative  action.  Rules 
routinely enacted in interactions in a social system across time and space may be so enacted 
because actors see no better alternative in their daily going concerns and interactions. Hence, a 
driver at a crossroad is likely to interpret the role of the policeman and the rules underlying his 
signals, and to enact them in rather unconscious fashion as desirable ones. However, it is 
always possible to imagine that a specific driver may engage in a calculation on the desirability 
to follow the rules in a specific context (e.g. when he is in a rush and the policeman tells him 
to stop). That he stops in such situations may not be due to the ‘blind’ following of rules, but 
due  to  his  calculation  that,  given  the  field  of  social  relations  in  which  he  is  immersed, 
compliance is the best course of action. Hence, besides looking at rules and routines that are 
recurrently followed in a social system, one may also have to look at what disciplines the 
following of those rules: how are drivers produced as ‘good drivers’ across multiple situations, 
in that their interests are aligned to the rules of good driving.  
 
In short, there is no inherent inconsistency or mutual exclusivity between calculation 
of desired outcomes in everyday social relations and the routine enactment of rules and the 
production  of  social  stabilities.  Such  an  enactment  may  be  seen  –  sometimes  in  rather 
automatic fashion, sometimes less so – as the best way to make sense of situations and others 
and as the best way to act. Social stabilities and constitution of strong dispositional powers 10 
may result from multiple calculative actions bound by rules that people may articulate and 
choose to enact as the best way to go on with their daily interactions while being sanctioned by 
others, an effect that may be facilitated by technologies of power.  
 
2.3. Critical approaches 
  Critical  approaches  have  observed  that  management  accounting  systems  and 
techniques  may  be  involved  in  the  reproduction  of  power  structures  that  advantage  some 
groups as against others. Here, we use the term ‘critical’ to broadly identify those studies 
whose assumptions can be seen as derived – even if in indirect manner – from the work of Karl 
Marx and historical materialism. A key trait of such approaches is that organisations, their 
systems and procedures reflect and also reproduce the societal structures operating at a given 
time. Hence, management accounting systems and techniques can and should be understood in 
relation to their historical and societal context. Typically, such systems and techniques are 
theorised in terms of predominant relations of production – specifically the capitalist ones in 
modern times. 
 
  This is the basic theoretical assumption, for instance, of labour process theorists in 
management accounting. Inspired mostly by the work of Braverman (1974), such theorists 
emphasise the roles of management accounting techniques, such as standard costing or return 
on investment, in reproducing relations of production that lead to the appropriation of surplus 
value from labour by the capitalist class (classical work includes Burawoy, 1979; Edwards, 
1979; Johnson, 1980; Hopper et al., 1986; Hopper and Armstrong, 1991). Rather than some 
‘negotiated order’, organisational order is thus seen – from the labour process perspective – as 
a ‘domination order’ in which devices such as management accounting are deployed to protect 
the vested interests of capital or its representatives. 
 
However, the conceptualisation of power implied in critical approaches has been the 
aim of a fundamental criticism: the identification of interests with individuals and groups is 
made on a structuralist basis, usually that of ‘class’. Class interests are typically defined by 
economic criteria. Organisations are seen as sites of struggle in which these interests are fought 
over. Therefore, management accounting systems are seen as involved in conflicts between 
classes with ‘objective’ interests, defined by the economic relations in a given society. The 
capability of organisational actors to assume interests and to deploy strategies other than those 
defined by their belonging to a specific class is severely limited. In this sense, management 
accounting systems and techniques are seen in rather rigid terms as mechanisms that reflect 11 
underlying structures and fixed power relations, rather than devices potentially involved in 
everyday attempts to produce and reproduce those structures and relations.  
 
2.4. Post-structuralist approaches 
The  suggestion  in  critical  studies  that  management  accounting  systems  may  be 
involved in the creation and reproduction of situations of material asymmetry and domination 
is an important one. Also important is the insight that these systems should be understood in 
terms of the wider context in which they operate. However, critical studies conceptualise this 
context  in  terms  of  the  fixed  structures  that  define  (objective)  interests  of  organisational 
members along a criterion of class. Relatedly, those studies suggest a rigid conceptualisation of 
the roles that systems such as management accounting occupy in organisations. Management 
accounting is involved in the promotion of the interests of determinate classes in organisations 
which are seen as sites of class struggle. However, those roles may be conceptualised in a 
more dynamic and less rigid way.  
 
Namely, it may be considered that other factors (apart from economic ones) may be 
relevant in specific situations; in constituting actors, the interests they seek, the rules they 
follow  and  the  relations  they  establish.  Management  accounting  may  well  be  involved  in 
processes leading to the production and reproduction of situations of domination, possibly 
quite material ones. However, the constitution of actors implicated in those processes and the 
roles of management accounting in them may be regarded in a non-structurally defined way. 
That is, rather than serving specific classes with ‘objective and real’ interests, management 
accounting may be implied in the very attempts to enrol actors to specific representations of 
the interests they should seek. Structures of power may thus be problematised and accounted 
for in their construction and reproduction in specific contexts, rather than defined a priori 
through some ‘prime criterion’ such as economic determination.  
 
Post-structuralist research drawing on the work of Foucault constitutes an example of 
such an approach. Foucault (1982; 1984) calls for a conceptualisation of power in which the 
concern  is  with  understanding  how  power  constitutes  and  normalises  the  subject.  Modern 
forms of organisations (together with prisons, hospitals, schools and other institutions) may 
thus be envisaged as privileged sites in which the ‘capillary power’ that Foucault highlights is 
expressed and exerts its effects.  
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Foucault’s insights have been well represented in management accounting research. 
The  nature  and  historical  evolution  of  management  accounting  techniques  have  been 
associated with their ability to constitute an inscribing device in the building of ‘governable 
persons’ in specific organisations (Hoskin and Macve, 1994; Loft, 1994; Miller and O’Leary, 
1987).  
 
Furthermore, a considerable body of research inspired (not always explicitly) by post-
structuralist insights has also emerged, drawing on the ‘Sociology of Translation’ or ‘Actor-
Network Theory’ (ANT, see Preston et al., 1992; Chua, 1995; Lowe, 2001; Quattrone and 
Hopper,  on  press).  In  a  sense,  the  set  of  concepts  proposed  by  this  body  of  research  has 
allowed for the operationalisation, in specific ‘micro’ settings, of the more descriptive and 
dynamic conceptualisation of the workings of power. That is, a ‘machiavellian’ conception 
(Clegg, 1989), of accounting for the multiple strategies and events that lead to the production 
of specific power configurations.  
 
Indeed, ANT authors have conceptualised management accounting as a device capable 
of  securing  alignments  between  representations  of  the  world  across  time  and  space. 
Management accounting may be centrally involved in the framing of strategies of enrolment 
conducted by strategic minded agencies. That is, in attempts to produce new configurations of 
power relations, and also in fixing and reproducing such configurations, by its ability to create 
centres  of  calculation  or  discretion,  thus  intervening  in  everyday  interpretations,  social 
relations and practices (e.g. various articles in Munro and Mouritsen, 1996; Munro, 1999). 
Based in these insights, the next section explores possible roles of management accounting in 
organisations. 
 
3. A framework to the study of management accounting in organisations 
From the previous discussion emerges a view of management accounting as involved 
in producing and reproducing configurations of the relations of power in organisations. Such a 
role is relevant even when no observable conflict occurs, and hence the present conception 
moves  away  from  conventional,  systemic  and  pluralist  perspectives  on  management 
accounting  and  power.  Like  interpretive/OIE  studies,  we  contend  that  the  fixing  of 
dispositional  powers  is  centrally  conducted  in  and  through  rules  that  may  be  carried  by 
management accounting systems. However, we also contend that management accounting may 
constitute a technology of discipline and production involved in the fixing of, and not only in 13 
carrying and suggesting, rules that are enacted in everyday interpretations, social relations and 
practices. 
 
This  does  not  mean  an  acceptance  of  an  alleged  universal  role  of  management 
accounting systems as involved in the promotion of the structurally fixed interests of some 
groups  (classes)  as  against  the  (real)  interests  of  other  groups.  Rather,  along  with  post-
structuralists we contend that management accounting is potentially involved in movements 
and  strategies  conducted  by  strategic-minded  actors,  in  attempts  to  enact  their  preferred 
representations in organisations. A central aim of these actors is precisely the very shaping of 
the  interests  of  those  potentially  enrolled.  Hence,  rather  than  assuming  that  management 
accounting is a technology that reflects existing structures, the present framework is more 
interested in describing how, in specific situations, such structures – seen in more flexible 
terms as (always contingent and potentially shifting) configurations of relations power – are 
produced, stabilised and overthrown.  
 
3.1. Management accounting as a carrier of rules 
Management accounting can be envisaged as a carrier of rules that may or may not 
become obligatory in specific organisations. That is, such rules can become institutionalised 
and  become  the  prevailing  basis  for  interactions  and  practices.  A  management  accounting 
system like a budgeting or performance evaluation system points to rules of orientation to 
financial  results.  Hence,  organisational  actors  may  give  meaning  to  situations  in  terms  of 
financial figures – for example, they may assess the operational decisions they are faced with 
in terms of their impact on budget variances or some performance indicator. Interactions with 
other actors may also be rooted in management accounting rules. For instance, a conversation 
taking place in the organisation, or an order, may be facilitated by the use of financial figures. 
Management accounting rules may also constitute a basis for membership in the organisation. 
The definition of appropriate or inappropriate behaviour for oneself or others may be defined 
by reference to financial figures or financial categorisations. 
 
An issue that can be raised at this point is whether management accounting always has 
the  capacity  to  become  a  privileged  basis  for  the  definition  of  rules  of  meaning  and 
membership enacted in organisations. The answer is probably that, in specific situations in 
time  and  space,  management  accounting  may  or  may  not  assume  such  a  central role.  All 
depends  on  the  way  it  is  involved  in  the  representations,  and  strategies  to  enact  those 
representations, within a prevailing configuration of power relations. To understand the fate of 14 
representations based on management accounting rules, one will have to analyse strategies 
conducted to enact those representations, and the events and counter-strategies that potentially 
ensue. Prevailing rules of meaning and membership may enhance or hinder those strategies, 
and thus the enactment of the proposed representations. For instance, and as OIE writers have 
shown, if rules of financial orientation are widely institutionalised in an organisation it is likely 
that  a  strategy  to  impose  a  supposedly  ‘better’  management  accounting  system  will  be 
facilitated. On the contrary, if other bases for meaning and membership prevail, for instance if 
financial values are widely perceived with suspicion, it is likely that such an imposition will be 
more difficult. 
 
One issue that remains is how can specific management accounting rules be enacted if 
they confront other, conflicting, rules of meaning and membership prevailing in a specific 
organisation?  
 
3.2. Management accounting as technology of discipline and production 
Management accounting systems are not only ‘rule books’. They not only transmit a 
set of rules of financial orientation, but also – potentially – provide for the very following of 
those rules. There is a material dimension to management accounting, reflected mainly in the 
disciplinary and productive characteristics of management accounting reports and figures. For 
instance, a performance evaluation system probably involves, on the one hand, a set of rules 
such as an orientation to specific measures of financial performance. On the other hand, such a 
system will also involve the production of reports that render the following (or non-following) 
of  those  rules  visible  in  multiple  time-space  contexts,  such  as  performance  evaluation 
meetings.  Therefore,  it  is  likely  that  attempts  to  implement  management  accounting  in 
organisations will not merely involve the proposal and communication of specific rules, but 
also the creation of material conditions conducive to their enactment. 
   
Management accounting systems may constitute not only a carrier of rules of meaning 
and membership that may or may not become obligatory in specific settings. These systems 
may also function as technologies of discipline and production, facilitating the interpretation 
and following of those rules. Specifically, management accounting may (1) create lines of 
visibility (or centres of calculation) that produce surveillance effects, potentially promoting 
discipline; and (2) facilitate the interpretation and following of rules, by providing timely and 
adequate information capable of aiding everyday decisions and actions. 
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The  first  of  these  characteristics  points  to  the  potential  panoptical  effects  of 
management accounting systems. Actors in the organisation may know that their conformity or 
non-conformity to the rules of meaning and membership dictated by such systems are subject 
to a permanent gaze. Lines of visibility into the actions and performance of specific actors are 
opened, and the existence of some assessment or normalising criteria guarantees an orientation 
to  the  rules  carried  by  management  accounting  systems.  Disciplinary  effects  –  that  is, 
disposition to follow the rules – may therefore be created.  
 
The  creation  of  disciplinary  effects  by  management  accounting  systems  must, 
however, be seen in terms of prevailing configurations of power. For instance, an employee 
working in the customer’s service department is faced with a recently developed system of 
financial indicators of performance that advises her to give priority to profitable customers 
over less profitable ones. However, she knows that this system is not the main basis for her 
performance  assessment.  The  organisational  structure  is  highly  hierarchical,  and  her 
hierarchical superior does not accept the terms of the new management accounting system. If 
no means are available to discipline this last individual, it is possible that rules followed in the 
department will be insulated from the rules dictated by that system. 
 
However,  even if dispositions are created for the enactment of rules dictated by a 
specific  management  accounting  system,  such  enactment  may  not  occur.  For  instance,  a 
system  of  contribution  margins  by  geographical  area  may  be  implemented,  and  reports 
assessed in board meetings. However, a sales manager responsible for a certain geographical 
area may simply not know how to orient everyday decisions and actions in order to increase 
the contributions of her area. Here, the problem is that rules do not provide for their own 
interpretation: different meanings may be attached to the supposedly same rules. One manager 
may wrongly believe that increasing sales volumes will necessarily lead to better contribution 
margins. Other manager may understand that selling to non-profitable customers may have a 
negative  effect  on  those  margins.  But  even  if  all  sales  managers  interpret  the  rules  being 
transmitted, and even understand that sales to non-profitable customers are to be avoided, there 
may still be a problem: how to identify these customers?  
 
These  examples  point  to  the  above-mentioned  second  potential  characteristic  of 
management accounting systems as a technology of discipline and production. Here, at stake 
are  the  enabling  features  of  these  systems.  They  may  allow  for  the  enactment  of  a 
representation of the sales departments as oriented to rules leading to improved contribution 16 
margins.  For  instance,  if  an  adequate  system  is  enacted,  involving  simple  and  reliable 
indicators that are provided to sales managers on a timely basis, it is possible that the rules 
enacted  at  the  operational  level  will  be  aligned  with  that  representation:  non-profitable 
customers will be avoided, and an orientation to contribution margins will be achieved. 
  
Further, and once more, other features of circuits of power may facilitate or constrain 
the  ability  of  management  accounting  systems  to  constitute  a  powerful  technology  of 
discipline and production, capable of disciplining and enabling the following of specific rules. 
For instance, many organisational actors – and especially those in the sales departments – may 
be illiterate in terms of financial language and rules. In other words, there may be considerable 
difficulty  in  fixing  rules  of  meaning.  People  may  simply  not  understand  the  rules  being 
transmitted by the new system.  
 
Also, other material conditions may enhance or hinder the potential of management 
accounting  systems  as  technologies  of  discipline  and  production.  For  instance,  the  non-
availability  of  a  powerful  Information  Technology  (IT)  may  hinder  the  reliability  and 
timeliness of the reports produced (if, say, the technology does not ensure accurate and timely 
recording). Not surprisingly, processes of restructuring and organisational change – including 
those  involving  management  accounting  change  –  often  involve  the  adoption  of  a  new 
information technology like an Enterprise Resource Planning System. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This  paper  presented  a  discussion  on  the  roles  that  management  accounting  may 
perform in organisations and organisational change processes. Firstly, we reviewed different 
conceptions of the relationship between management accounting and power that have been 
present in the literature. This constitutes, we believe, a useful exercise in itself, and allowed us 
to locate and clarify our own perspective. Conventional, systemic and pluralist perspectives on 
power more or less explicitly associate the phenomenon of power with the occurrence of overt 
conflicts. Hence, management accounting will establish a relation with power if involved in 
such conflicts. However, we suggested that power may be present even if no overt conflict 
takes place. For instance, it may be linked to institutionalised rules in a social system, as so-
called  OIE  authors  would  tend  to  argue.  Also,  power  is  implied  in  prevailing  material 
conditions, such as the distributions of resources or existing technologies of discipline and 
production that advantage the interests of some groups over others.  
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Our conceptualisation of management accounting and power – described in section 3 – 
follows  from  a  recognition  that  power  is  present  in  dimensions  that  underlie  its  episodic 
manifestations. We contended that management accounting can, firstly, be seen as a carrier of 
rules  of  meaning  and  membership.  It  may  constitute  a  ‘rule-book’  through  which  actors 
attempt to propose and promote specific rules (e.g. of financial orientation) to other actors 
whom  they  wish  to  enrol.  However,  prevailing  rules  may  hinder  the  acceptance  and  the 
enactment  of  new  management  accounting  rules.  We  also  contended  that  management 
accounting  can  be  conceptualised  as  a  technology  potentially  capable  of  disciplining  and 
enabling  the  following  of  the  very  rules  it  carries.  This  is  linked  with  the  ability  of 
management accounting systems to create lines of visibility and also to provide adequate and 
timely information that facilitates the interpretation and enactment of specific rules. It was 
noted, however, that the capability of management accounting to produce disciplinary and 
enabling effects may itself be constrained or enabled by the characteristics of the prevailing 
configuration of power relations.  18 
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